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COMMENT
A HOUSE DIVIDED
AGAINST ITSELF CANNOT STAND:1
THE CASE FOR ENDING THE




A. A Brief Overview of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s
“Keav, why are the soldiers so mean to us?” I ask, clinging even
more tightly to her. “Shhh. They are called Khmer Rouge. They
are the Communists.” . . . Keav tells me the soldiers claim to love
Cambodia and its people very much.2
Author Loung Ung’s personal narrative in First They Killed My Fa-
ther, about one of the most tragic stories of our lifetime, recounts her per-
sonal experience of survival during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.
1. Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided, Speech at Springfield, Illinois, (June 16, 1858) in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461–89 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
* LL.M., 2013, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; J.D., 2012,
University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota. I would like to thank former
U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues and current Special Expert to United Nations As-
sistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT), David Scheffer, for his thoughtful presentation at
the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center on February 8, 2012. Special Expert Scheffer
gave me much to think about during the presentation and after briefly speaking to him. I would
like to thank Rupert Abbott of Amnesty International for his contribution to this note by way of a
Skype interview from Cambodia. Mr. Abbott was my supervisor at the UNAKRT in the summer
of 2011. Mr. Abbott is now Amnesty International’s Asia Researcher on Cambodia, Laos and Viet
Nam. In addition, I am grateful to my other colleagues at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), whom I met in the summer of 2011 in Cambodia. I am forever
inspired by your dedication and passion to international justice. I would also like to thank my
Fletcher colleague, Mike Eckel, for his insightful feedback based on his experiences as an ECCC
writer and trial monitor. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Delahunty and my husband,
Amos Oh, for their continual support.
2. LOUNG UNG, FIRST THEY KILLED MY FATHER: A DAUGHTER OF CAMBODIA REMEMBERS
22 (Harper Perennial 2006).
502
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 2  3-JAN-14 13:55
2012] ENDING THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN CAMBODIA 503
Sadly, she explains that her story “mirrors that of millions of Cambodians”3
from 1975 to 1979. Loung states, “[i]f you had been living in Cambodia
during this period, this would be your story too.”4 Her memory of her six-
teen-year-old neighbor’s sexual abduction by Khmer Rouge soldiers gives
merely a sliver of the overall reality that so many endured:
[T]he soldiers grabbed Davi by her arms and pulled her from her
mother’s shaking hug.
. . . .
The soldiers do not stop with Davi. They come many more nights
and take many other girls. . . . It is her duty, they say, to marry
soldiers and bear sons for the Angkar. . . . If they do not fulfill
their duty, they are worthless and . . . . [m]ight as well die so their
food rations can go to those who contribute to rebuilding the
country. There is nothing the parents can do to stop the abduction
of these young girls because the soldiers are all-powerful. They
have the power of judge, jury, police, and army. They have the
rifles. Many girls choose to escape from their abductors by com-
mitting suicide.5
Although Cambodia is an incredible country, with a rich, fascinating
history and culture, it is unmistakably marred by one of the worst stories of
human violence in the last century. During Cambodia’s civil war in the
1970s, a communist party named the Khmer Rouge, officially known as the
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK),6 came into power on April 17,
19757 and established Democratic Kampuchea, the formal name for Cam-
bodia under Pol Pot’s rule.8 Under the Khmer Rouge regime between April
1975 and January 1979, approximately 1.7 million Cambodians died as a
result of the regime’s policies. As the Khmer Rouge came to power, their
“first word was a lie wrapped around a deep anger and hatred of the kind of
society they felt Cambodia was becoming.”9 One of the lies the Khmer
Rouge told Cambodians was that America would bomb their cities.10
Simply stated, the Khmer Rouge wished to create a pure, self-reliant,
sovereign Khmer nation.11 In order to develop a “clean social system,” Pol
Pot’s Khmer Rouge transformed the economic and social systems of the
3. Id. at xi.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 70–72.
6. Chronology of Modern Cambodian History: Timeline of the Khmer Rouge’s Rise and
Fall from Power, CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR, http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/history/chro-
nology-khmer-rouge-movement (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Chronology of Modern
Cambodian History].
7. Id.
8. STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 307 (3d ed. 2009).
9. Teeda Butt Mam, Worms from Our Skin, in CHILDREN OF CAMBODIA’S KILLING FIELDS:
MEMOIRS BY SURVIVORS 11, 11 (Kim DePaul Dith Pran comp., 1997).
10. Id.
11. RATNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 306.
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country by forcibly moving thousands of urban people to the countryside.12
Many Cambodians felt they “were less than a grain of rice in a large pile,”
and that their lives meant nothing to the “great Communist nation.”13 The
Khmer Rouge proclaimed, in fact, “‘[t]o keep you is no benefit, to destroy
you is no loss.’”14 With that, the Khmer Rouge forced “millions of re-
sidents of Phnom Penh and other cities out of their homes,”15 which re-
sulted in what are called the “Killing Fields.”16
The regime’s “‘Four-Year Plan’ . . . called for the collectivization of
all private property and placed high national priority on the cultivation of
rice.”17 This required Cambodians to work “more than [twelve] hours a
day,” every day, “without adequate rest or food.”18 Tragically, approxi-
mately one in every five Cambodians perished in less than four years’
time,19 not only from intentional killings, but also from “[s]tarvation, dis-
ease, and physical exhaustion caused by inadequate food, medicine, and
sanitation, and oppressive work requirements . . . .”20 “Witnesses reported
that the Khmer Rouge overseers routinely killed many thousands who re-
fused or could no longer work, often murdering their family members as
well.”21
The forced movement and systematic killings of almost two million
people happened in less than four years. By the beginning of 1979,
Vietnamese troops captured Phnom Penh and Khmer Rouge leaders fled to
the Cambodia-Thai border.22 Ironically, “[t]he United Nations recognized
the Khmer Rouge as the only legitimate representative” during this time.23
Nevertheless, Vietnam created a new government and did not withdraw its
troops until 1990.24 Shortly thereafter, Cambodian parties signed a peace
agreement in Paris on October 23, 1991.25 The Khmer Rouge, however,
12. Id. at 307.
13. Mam, supra note 9, at 12–13.
14. Id. at 13.
15. RATNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 308–09.
16. The “Killing Fields” are mass gravesites where the bodies of victims of the Khmer Rouge
were left to disintegrate. “The best-known site of mass graves, littered with bones and pieces of
ripped clothing, is Choeung Ek, about 10 miles south of Phnom Penh.” Andrew Buncombe, Tears
and Prayers as Khmer Rouge ‘Torturer’ is Taken Back to the Killing Fields, THE INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tears-and-prayers-as-khmer-rouge-
torturer-is-taken-back-to-the-killing-fields-787929.html.
17. Chronology of Modern Cambodian History, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. RATNER ET AL., supra note 8, at 313–14.
20. Id. at 342.
21. Id. (footnote omitted).
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continued to exist until 1999—although it no longer controlled the govern-
ment—when the last surviving leader, Ta Mok, was captured.26
B. Was There a Response to the Khmer Rouge Killings?
In 2001, a “hybrid”27 tribunal called the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter “ECCC” or “Court”) was established
to respond to the “atrocity crimes”28 allegedly committed by the Khmer
Rouge from April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979. The creation of this court
raised an important question: if a hybrid or ad hoc tribunal is established in
a country without an independent judiciary and a rule of law, can it properly
function and carry out its mandate while striving to bring about justice and
leave a legacy? In the instance of the tribunal in Cambodia, the answer at
this time appears to be “no.”
This Comment takes the position that unless the Cambodian govern-
ment agrees to ensure that Case 002, the next case on the ECCC’s docket, is
held to the highest of international standards, the United Nations (“UN”)
should mandate the ECCC’s dismantlement immediately. This article ex-
plores the decreased credibility of this hybrid tribunal and discusses the
obstacles that the ECCC faces from an outward, Western perspective;
namely, my experience as an intern at the Court during the summer of 2011.
Section I of this paper provides a brief overview of the establishment, man-
date, and cases of the ECCC. Section II provides reasons for ending the
ECCC unless Case 002 meets international standards. Section III looks at
the arguments for pressing forward with the ECCC’s mandate and responds
to them with counter arguments. Finally, Section IV offers a solution to
achieving many of the ECCC’s goals and objectives.
26. Chronology of Modern Cambodian History, supra note 6.
27. Hybrid tribunals are “called ‘hybrid’ because they involve the combined effort of the
international community and the national institutions of the country where they [sic] crimes were
committed. The hybrid tribunals typically employ both national and international judicial actors
and incorporate both domestic and international law in their statutes.” David Cohen, “Hybrid”
Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospect for the
Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2007).
28. During the last decade of the twentieth century, one of the most ambitious judicial
experiments in the history of humankind—a global assault on the architects of atroci-
ties—found its purpose as mass killings and ethnic cleansing consumed entire regions of
the earth. The grand objective since 1993 has been to end impunity at the highest levels
of government and the military not only for genocide, which captures the popular imagi-
nation with its heritage in the Holocaust, but also for the far less understood offenses of
crimes against humanity and even war crimes. Because such crimes coexist as heinous
acts in almost every atrocity zone, and because the criminal tribunals built in recent
years have bundled them together in complex prosecutorial strategies, I use the term
atrocity crimes . . . .
DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBU-
NALS 2 (2012).
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I. BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE ECCC
A. How was the ECCC Established?
“The creation of the Cambodia Tribunal—spanning 1997 to 2006—
took longer than the creation of any other international or hybrid criminal
tribunal in the post-Cold War era.”29 After the Cambodian atrocity crimes
and subsequent civil war ended with the Paris Peace Accords in 1991,30
Cambodia and the international community began to consider what, if any,
response it would take to the fact that approximately 1.7 million people had
perished under the Khmer Rouge regime.31 David Scheffer, the first Ameri-
can war crimes ambassador-at-large,32 “helped marshal State Department
efforts in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to formulate a request
that U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan examine seriously any request
from Cambodia for assistance to develop a mechanism of accountability for
the atrocity crimes of the Pol Pot era.”33 And Cambodia did, in fact, request
such assistance of the UN shortly thereafter. On June 21, 1997, first Prime
Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and second Prime Minister Hun Sen
asked Annan “‘for the assistance of the United Nations and the interna-
tional community in bringing justice to those persons responsible for the
genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge
from 1975 to 1979.’”34
The UN’s initial response to the atrocities and the request for assis-
tance was mixed with pro-amnesty for some leaders of the Khmer Rouge in
exchange for a return to peace within the country.35 The Cambodian gov-
ernment, however, needed the UN’s assistance because it lacked the exper-
tise and resources to effectively respond to the atrocities.36 Still, many
countries, even those that were relatively in favor of ending impunity of
human rights violations or grave crimes in Cambodia, did not initially sup-
port an ad hoc tribunal like the ECCC.37 In fact, in the initial planning and
brainstorming phase, Scheffer
advised that it would be desirable to remove Pol Pot and perhaps
other Khmer Rouge leaders from Cambodia, that they be trans-
ported to a country that exercised universal (or near-universal)
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, and that they ulti-
29. Id. at 343.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (explaining that negotiations towards establishing a criminal tribunal did not oc-
cur until 1997 because Cambodian society remained fragile and its political climate was
explosive).
33. Id. at 345.
34. SCHEFFER, supra note 28, at 345–46.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 346 (explaining that Cambodia’s two prime ministers expressed the belief that UN
assistance was necessary in their letter to Kofi Annan).
37. Id.
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mately be brought to justice before some sort of U.N.-constituted
or U.N.-approved judicial body.38
After Pol Pot’s death on April 15, 1998, the US continued to support
accountability for the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge. President
Clinton stated, “[a]lthough the opportunity to hold Pol Pot accountable for
his monstrous crimes appears to have passed . . . [w]e must not permit the
death of the most notorious of the Khmer Rouge leaders to deter us from
the equally important task of bringing . . . others to justice.”39
With the political will finally in favor of ending impunity among the
Khmer Rouge senior leaders, the Cambodian government and the UN ulti-
mately came to an agreement and established a “uniquely designed national
Cambodian court” called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia.40 The Court’s founding legal documents are: 1) 2001 Law on
the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers;41 2) 2004 Law to Amend
the 2001 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers;42 and
3) “Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea” (hereinafter “The
Agreement”).43 The Agreement sets forth thirty-two articles, including the
recognition of the establishment of the ECCC, and thus prevails over the
Law on the Extraordinary Chambers.44
The Cambodian government and the UN had lengthy negotiations over
the proper level of prosecution, but were eventually able to begin investi-
gating the first accused person in 2007, nearly thirty years after the
38. Id.
39. Elizabeth Becker, Pol Pot’s End Won’t Stop U.S. Pursuit of His Circle, N.Y.TIMES, Apr.
17, 1998 at A15.
40. SCHEFFER, supra note 28, at 342.
41. The ECCC Law, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/tags/topic/79 (last visited Oct. 10,
2013).
42. Law to Amend the 2001 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers,
Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/1004/006, (Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
documents/legal/law-amend-2001-law-establishment-extraordinary-chambers [hereinafter “Law to
Amend”].
43. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Con-
cerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, 2329 U.N.T.S. 41723, (June 6, 2003), available at http://www.unakrt-online.
org/Docs/Court%20Documents/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf (entered into force Apr.
29, 2005) [hereinafter “The Agreement”].
44. See Ernestine E. Meijer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure
of an Internationalized National Tribunal in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBU-
NALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 207, 210 (Cesare P. Romano, Andre
Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (explaining that Articles 2 and
31 of the Agreement bind Cambodia and the ECCC to rules of international law and that Cambo-
dia may not use its domestic law as an excuse for any failure to carry out its obligations estab-
lished by international law).
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Cambodian atrocity crimes had ended.45 However, “[a]ll the compromising
and giving in by the United Nations to the demands of the Cambodian gov-
ernment . . . resulted in a structure of a dubious legal quality.”46 An ECCC
analyst observed that this lack of quality was in the procedural law and
structure of the court system, which made the “tribunal prone to very long
procedures, obstruction, and delaying of justice.”47
Because of the almost total lack of independence in the Cambodian
domestic judiciary, there were serious concerns regarding its ability to ar-
rive at a structure that would ensure that the ECCC could function indepen-
dently and meet appropriate international standards.48 At the dawn of the
ECCC, one scholar remarked:
[o]f course, whether the Extraordinary Chambers are able to do
what they were established for will depend to a large extent on
the willingness of the Cambodian government to cooperate with
the Extraordinary Chambers, on the integrity of the judges, inves-
tigating judges, prosecutors, and support staff. If the government
gives its full cooperation and all of the officials of the Extraordi-
nary Chambers fulfill their tasks with the impartiality and integ-
rity required, the Extraordinary Chambers may achieve the result
aimed for: bringing to justice those responsible for the ‘killing
fields’ of Cambodia.49
And at this time in 2007, the ECCC was Cambodia’s and the international
community’s best attempt to end impunity for atrocity crimes that occurred
from 1975 to 1979 and to bring justice to the people of Cambodia who
suffered so much under the Khmer Rouge.
B. What is the Role of the ECCC?
The ECCC is a “special new court” designed to be independent of both
the Cambodian government and the UN.50 “It is a Cambodian court with
international participation that will apply international standards. It will
provide a new role model for court operations in Cambodia.”51 As is often
noted, the ECCC is a unique court because “[i]t is a domestic Cambodian
court with Cambodian legal procedure but is comprised of both Cambodian
45. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, was placed into provisional detention in 2007 by order of
the Co-Investigating Judges of the ECCC. He was indicted in 2008, and his Initial Appearance
took place in 2009. Case 001, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE CTS. OF CAMBODIA, http://
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
46. Meijer, supra note 44, at 232.
47. Id. at 232.
48. Cohen, supra note 27, at 27.
49. Meijer, supra note 44, at 232.
50. Introduction to the ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
51. See id.
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and international lawyers and judges who enforce domestic and interna-
tional laws.”52
C. Who is Accountable?
A widely debated issue, the Cambodian government and the UN fi-
nally came to The Agreement after long and contentious debates that the
ECCC would bring “to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and
those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and in-
ternational conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed dur-
ing the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”53 “This agreement
took many years to reach and involved notoriously difficult and protracted
negotiations over the issues of Cambodian ‘ownership of the process’ and
independence.”54
Thus far, there has been one convicted in Case 001 and four accused in
Case 002.55 The ECCC has found one of the accused in Case 002—Ieng
Thirith—unfit to stand trial and has ordered her release.56 Additionally, the
proceedings against her husband, Ieng Sary, were terminated due to his
death on March 14, 2013.57 There are five more individuals who are sus-
pects in Cases 003 and 004, but their identities remain confidential because
there are no requirements to make these public when no formal charges
have been brought.58 However, the individuals’ names are widely known
amongst those familiar with the ECCC.
D. What Crimes can be Charged at the ECCC?
The ECCC has subject-matter jurisdiction for the following crimes
under Cambodian law: murder, torture, and religious persecution. Under
international law, the ECCC may prosecute those accused of the following
crimes: genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (such as mass killing or causing seri-
ous mental or physical harm intended to destroy all or part of a national,
52. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Resources for the Cambodian Diaspora, THE ADVOCATES
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 28, 2012) http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/the_khmer_
rouge_tribunal.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
53. The Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 1 (emphasis added).
54. Cohen, supra note 27, at 27.
55. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by the Supreme Court
Chamber, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
articles/kaing-guek-eav-alias-duch-sentenced-life-imprisonment-supreme-court-chamber-0 (last
visited May 28, 2013).
56. Case 002, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.
gov.kh/en/case/topic/2 (last visited May 28, 2013).
57. Id.
58. Case 003, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.
gov.kh/en/case/topic/286 (last visited May 28, 2013).
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ethnic, racial, or religious group); crimes against humanity as defined in the
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (such as mass mur-
der, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, imprisonment, perse-
cution on political, racial and religious grounds, rape and other crimes of
sexual violence); grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (such as un-
lawful treatment of civilians or prisoners of war, attacks on civilian targets,
and destruction of educational or religious institutions); destruction of cul-
tural property (such as theft or damage of historical buildings, archaeologi-
cal sites, museums, art, and important book collections); and crimes against
internationally protected persons (diplomats).59
E. What is the Appellate Process at the ECCC?
The ECCC operates under the civil law system60 and is uniquely or-
ganized with three judicial chambers—Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber,
and Supreme Court Chamber—and an investigatory office called the Office
of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ). “The judicial chambers operate on
the principle of supermajority, but the Co-Prosecutors and Co-Investigating
judges are expected to work jointly by achieving consensus in their deci-
sion-making.”61 The OCIJ is comprised of a national (Cambodian) judge
and an international (other than Cambodian) judge and investigates facts
from the Co-Prosecutors before it issues a Closing Order. Appeal of an
OCIJ order is heard before the Pre-Trial Chamber, which has three national
and two international judges.62 The Trial Chamber makes decisions and
judgments about whether an accused is guilty or innocent based on all par-
ties’ presentation at trial.63 The Trial Chamber is also made up of three
national and two international judges.64 Appeal of a Trial Chamber verdict
is heard by the Supreme Court Chamber, which has four national and three
59. The Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 9 says:
Crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers. The subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be the crime of genocide as defined in
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as
defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as
promulgated on 10 August 2001.
60. “[T]he ECCC procedural law is based upon Cambodian law which is itself heavily influ-
enced by the French civil law system.” Michael Saliba, Civil Party Participation at ECCC: Over-
view, CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/blog/
2009/11/civil-party-participation-eccc-overview.
61. Robert Petit & Anees Ahmed, A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Khmer Rouge Tribu-
nal, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 165 ¶ 19, (2010).
62. Organizational Chart of the ECCC, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/
ECCCchart-%20December2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). See also Law to Amend, supra
note 42, at 6–7.
63. Judicial Chambers, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/judicial-chamber (last visited Feb.
18, 2013).
64. Organizational Chart of the ECCC, supra note 62; see also Law to Amend, supra note
42, at 3.
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international judges.65 Interestingly, the Supreme Court Chamber has the
ability to increase a sentence by overturning the sentencing decision of the
Trial Chamber, as happened in Case 001 before the Supreme Court
Chamber.66
F. What are the Cases at the ECCC?
1. Case 001
In the first case, Case 001, Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Comrade Duch”)
the former Chairman of the Khmer Rouge S-21 Security Prison in Phnom
Penh, was the only defendant.67 During the Khmer Rouge regime, Duch
was “head of Democratic Kampuchea’s ‘special branch’—the Santebal.
The Santebal was in charge of internal security and running of the prison
camps.”68 “Duch was transferred from military detention and placed in pro-
visional detention” on July 31, 2007, and had his initial hearing before the
Trial Chamber in February 2009.69 On July 26, 2010, the Trial Chamber
found Duch guilty of two international crimes.70 First, he was found guilty
of crimes against humanity for persecution on political grounds, which sub-
sumed the crimes against human extermination (encompassing murder), en-
slavement, imprisonment, torture (including one instance of rape), and other
inhumane acts.71 Second, he was found guilty of grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949; namely, willful killing, torture and inhumane
treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian of the rights of fair
and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a civilian.72
In 2010, the Trial Chamber sentenced Duch to thirty-five years of im-
prisonment but then reduced his sentence to thirty years because of Duch’s
unlawful detention from 1999 to 2007.73 Duch also received credit for time
already served in detention, thus resulting in nineteen total years of impris-
65. Organizational Chart of the ECCC, supra note 62; see also Law to Amend, supra note
42.
66. Case 001, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2012)
[hereinafter “Case 001”].
67. Id.
68. Northwestern University School of Law & Youk Chhang, Accused Persons: Kaing Guek
Eav (a.k.a. “Comrade Duch”), CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR, http://www.cambodia-tribunal.
org/tribunal-background/accused-persons (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) [hereinafter “Accused
Persons”].
69. Case 001, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. Accused Persons, supra note 68; see also Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 5, 2–3 http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/
KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.
72. See id. at art. 6; see also Accused Persons, supra note 68.
73. Case 001, supra note 66.
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onment.74 The Trial Chambers judgment was appealed by both sides; how-
ever, in February 2012, the Supreme Court Chamber actually increased
Duch’s prison sentence from thirty-five years to life imprisonment.75 “A
life sentence is the maximum penalty available under the law for crimes
against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention,
which set forth standards of international law for the humanitarian treat-
ment of the victims of war.”76 The Supreme Court Chamber overturned the
Trial Chamber’s sentencing decision and reasoned that too much weight
had been given to Duch’s illegal detention.77
While Cambodians and the international community, including Steven
Rapp, US ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues,78 seem generally sat-
isfied with a life sentence for Duch, the human rights community in Cam-
bodia, and elsewhere, pointed out that the sentence appeared to violate
Duch’s right to be given credit for his illegal detention before being trans-
ferred to detention at the ECCC. According to Article 9(1) of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which
Cambodia is a party,79 “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law.”80 Theary Seng, a
Cambodian human rights activist who lost her parents under the regime,
stated, “[i]t feeds into my fear that this was really a political decision to
make Duch the scapegoat for the whole regime. . . . We’re only starting to
chip away at the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge era. Duch should not be
made the face of the Khmer Rouge regime.”81
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Maly Leng & Samean Yun, Cambodia: Duch Appeal Rejected, Gets Life, UNHCR, Feb.
3, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,KHM,,4f3a2520c,0.html.
77. Case 001, supra note 66.
78. Mark McDonald, A Life Sentence for 14,000 Deaths, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
Feb. 6, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/a-life-sentence-for-14000-deaths/.
79. The Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 13: Rights of the Accused.
1. The rights of the accused enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall be respected throughout the trial process.
Such rights shall, in particular, include the right: to a fair and public hearing; to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty; to engage a counsel of his or her choice; to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence [sic]; to have coun-
sel provided if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and to examine or
have examined the witnesses against him or her. 2. The United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia agree that the provisions on the right to defence [sic] counsel
in the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers mean that the accused has
the right to engage counsel of his or her own choosing as guaranteed by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art14 [hereinafter
“ICCPR”].
81. Bridget Di Certo, Judge’s Order Draws Praise, THE PHNOM PENH POST, Feb. 13, 2012,
http://issuu.com/cofficer/docs/120220.news.scan.13-19_febraury._phnom_penh_post.
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But in Duch, the perfect soldier of the revolution, the government
and the judiciary found the perfect villain to make into a symbol
of justice. Yet while the difference between a sentence of 30 years
and one of life in prison also carries much symbolism, there is no
sentence commensurate with the crimes.82
Whether Duch will continue as the face of the Khmer Rouge regime may be
dictated, in part, by the outcome of Case 002.
2. Case 002
In the second case, Case 002, there are two named defendants: (1)
Nuon Chea, also known as “Brother No. 2” and former Deputy Secretary of
the Communist Party of Kampuchea; and (2) Khieu Samphan, former Head
of State.83 The defendants were indicted on charges of crimes against hu-
manity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and genocide,
by killing Vietnamese and Cham.84 The initial hearing of Case 002 oc-
curred on June 27, 2011, and the opening statements commenced on No-
vember 21, 2011.85 In 2011, the ECCC’s Supreme Court Chamber stayed
the charges against a fourth defendant, Ieng Thirith, former Minister of So-
cial Affairs, after the Trial Chamber reaffirmed its previous conclusion that
she remained “unfit to stand trial due to a progressive, dementing illness.”86
On September 13, 2012, the Trial Chamber reaffirmed an earlier decision
that found Ieng Thirith unfit to stand trial and ordered her released from
detention at the ECCC.87
3. Cases 003 and 004
Cases 003 and 004 officially have no named defendants. In 2011, how-
ever, disgruntled staff in the OCIJ leaked court documents shortly before
they tendered their resignation at the ECCC.88 As a result, in Case 003, also
known as the “military case,” it is widely believed that the defendants will
82. Thierry Cruvellier, Op-Ed., The Khmer Rouge’s Perfect Villain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/opinion/the-khmer-rouges-perfect-villain.html?_r=2.
83. Case 002, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/2 (last visited May 28, 2013).




86. ECCC, Supreme Court Chamber, Decision on Immediate Appeal against the Trial Cham-
ber’s Order to Unconditionally Release the Accused Ieng Thirith, Case File/Dossier No. 002119-
09-2007 ECCC-TC/SC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2013-01-
04%2010:44/E138_1_10_1_5_7_EN.PDF.
87. ECCC, Trial Chamber, Decision on Reassessment of Accused Ieng Thirith’s Fitness to
Stand Trial Following Supreme Court Chamber Decision of 13 December 2011, Case File/Dossier
No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Page 19, http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/do-
cuments/E138_1_10_EN.pdf.
88. Email with former ECCC court reporter who wishes to remain anonymous [hereinafter
“Court Reporter”].
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include Navy Commander Meas Muth and Air Force Commander Sou
Met.89 In Case 004, it is suspected that the defendants will include three
Khmer Rouge regional officials: Ta An, Ta Tith, and Im Chaem.90
In both Cases 003 and 004, there is strong disagreement between the
Cambodian government and the UN regarding whether the suspects should
be investigated.91 The Cambodian government “has openly stonewalled on
new prosecutions beyond the current trial . . . [Prime Minister] Hun Sen
bluntly told visiting U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that new cases
would ‘not be allowed.’”92 Former International Reserve Co-Investigating
Judge Kasper-Ansermet publically supported reopening the investigations
in these cases, which is the suspected reason behind the Cambodian govern-
ment’s opposition to his appointment as the replacement International Co-
Investigating Judge at the ECCC. The Cambodian government—specifi-
cally the Supreme Council of the Magistracy—cited Judge Kasper-An-
sermet’s so-called unprofessionalism for using his Twitter account to
discuss the ongoing events at the ECCC.93 Although the government, spe-
cifically Hun Sen, “has warned of the potential for civil war . . . opposition
likely stems from the fact that many Khmer Rouge officials . . . are now in
government and fear that investigators could dredge up new evidence of
war crimes.”94 As one former UN staff member, who wishes to remain
anonymous, said, “[n]o one believes 003 and 004 will happen. It’ll take 002
until the last accused dies. The Court could die with the accused.”95
II. ARGUMENT FOR ENDING THE ECCC UNLESS THE CAMBODIAN
GOVERNMENT FULLY COOPERATES
As I developed my thesis that the UN should mandate the ECCC’s
completion unless Case 002 is held to international standards, I was hesitant
to take a position that might be interpreted as supporting impunity. How-
89. Sok Khemara, Suspect Questions ‘Most Responsible’ Tribunal Mandate, VOICE OF
AMERICA – KHMER (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/news/
suspectquestionsmostresponsibletribunalmandate.pdf.
90. Ste´phanie Giry, Necessary Scapegoats? The Making of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 23, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/
23/necessary-scapegoats-khmer-rouge-tribunal/ (last visited May 28, 2013).
91. Di Certo, supra note 81 (“Investigations into Case 003 were abruptly closed in April last
year by Cambodian co-investigating judge You Bunleng and German judge Siegfried Blunk. After
they closed investigations, international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley said a serious amount of
investigation into the government-opposed case still needed to be undertaken.”).
92. Mike Eckel, Cambodia’s Kangaroo Court: Why isn’t the U.N. Tribunal to Prosecute
Genocidal Khmer Rouge War Criminals Going After More Bad Guys?, FOREIGN POLICY, (July 20,
2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/20/cambodias_kangaroo_court.
93. Prak Chan Thul, U.N. Says Won’t Change Judge for Cambodia War Crimes Court,
REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-cambodia-rouge-idUSTR
E80O12K20120125.
94. Eckel, supra note 92; see also Chan Thul, supra note 93.
95. Telephone interview with former UN staff who wishes to remain anonymous [hereinafter
“UN Staff 1”].
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ever, upon conducting further research and interviewing ECCC staff and
former staff, I realized that that this idea—of ending the ECCC—was not
new. Some argue that the UN should take the position, supported by donors,
that it is impossible to pursue Cases 003 and 004 because the UN is in
Cambodia, and the Cambodian government does not want the cases to pro-
ceed. They argue that in order to provide justice to the victims of the Khmer
Rouge, all energies should be focused on Cases 001 and 002.96
While accountability for the almost-incomprehensible human violence
that occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime is important, fair trial rights
and human rights in Cambodia are just as important. One of the Defence
Support Section’s (DSS) duties was to continually remind the Court that the
ECCC should conduct trials against the accused—no matter who those ac-
cused were—in a manner that upheld fair trial rights, such as the right to be
innocent until proven guilty and the right to be tried by an impartial tribu-
nal.97 It was not necessarily about the individuals accused, though:
One of the reasons for having the tribunal in Cambodia was so
that it could have a positive impact on the domestic justice sys-
tem, and that was recognized way back by the UN, by Kofi An-
nan, in the early 2000 . . . and even the Royal Government of
Cambodia is on record saying it recognizes the tribunal will play
this role of improving the Cambodian justice system.98
Although the UN was aware a year-and-a-half ago that the Cambodian
government did not want to go through with any other cases after Case 002,
it chose to drive on, knowing that the government was interfering and the
political will was against the UN after Case 002. The UN seemed to have
the mentality that it had come this far and did not want to turn back. Rupert
Abbott, stated:
Amnesty International has not got to the point of asking for the
UN to withdraw from the ECCC. Obviously there are a lot of
people—including us—who want the tribunal to succeed, for the
victims of the Khmer Rouge. But there could come a point—if
the trials were clearly not meeting international fair trial stan-
dards—when we would consider making that call.99
I argue that the stakes in terms of upholding international human rights
are too high to maintain the status quo at the ECCC. The UN should man-
date the dismantling of the tribunal in Cambodia, conditioned upon cooper-
ation and zero interference from the Cambodian government, for several
reasons: 1) Cambodia lacks an independent judiciary because the
96. Telephone interview with former UN staff who wishes to remain anonymous [hereinafter
“UN Staff 2”].
97. See ICCPR, supra note 80, at art. 14.
98. Telephone interview with Rupert Abbott, Southeast Asia Researcher, Amnesty Interna-
tional (Mar. 20, 2012).
99. Id.
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Cambodian government interferes with the ECCC; 2) as a result, the ECCC
is not operating in accordance with international standards; 3) dysfunction
at the ECCC decreases its credibility; and 4) the ECCC’s resources are very
constrained and do not meet the needs of the victims in delivering an inter-
national standard of justice.
A. Cambodia Lacks an Independent Judiciary
Because Cambodia lacks an independent judiciary, it cannot be said
that the judges at the ECCC are impartial and able to deliver fair verdicts
against the accused. It is well known that the Cambodian judiciary has a
“dubious reputation . . . [that] is widely perceived as corrupt, lacking impar-
tiality and independence.”100 It was not uncommon to read in the local
newspapers about a trial conducted in absentia or corrupt judges taking
bribes.101 The norm appeared to be that the domestic courts could not be
trusted to deliver a fair verdict, and it was truly in a person’s best interest to
stay far away from the government-controlled court system.102 In fact, “the
Cambodian court system has been used to protect the interests of the ruling
party and its supporters, and to persecute those challenging the status
quo.”103
It could be assumed the ECCC would not face a similar issue of bias
and corruption among its judges—simply because the judges at the Court,
as part of a UN-backed tribunal, would be held to a higher standard and a
more rigorous selection process than the judges in Cambodia’s domestic
courts. As it turned out, I arrived at the Court about a week after almost the
entire support staff in the OCIJ quit because of their criticism of Interna-
tional Co-Investigating Judge Blunk’s management of Cases 003 and 004.
Apparently, “[the] judges closed the investigation into Case 003, despite
having taken no basic steps, such as questioning the suspects, identifying
crime sites, or notifying victims’ lawyers, to advance the case.”104 Judge
Blunk was seen as being partial and “siding” with his counterpart, National
Co-Investigating Judge You Bunleng, because he agreed, by issuing an or-
der, with Judge Bunleng that Cases 003 and 004 should not go forward.105
Allegedly, interviews of victims, suspects, and other relevant people were
100. Meijer, supra note 44, at 218.
101. Briefing Paper, Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
(LICADHO), In Absentia 2012: An Update on Cambodia’s Inmate Transportation Crisis & the
Right to Appeal, 3, April 2012, http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports.php?perm=165.
102. Mark Ellis, The ECCC – A Failure of Credibility, 2012 INT’L BAR ASS’N REP. 7, availa-
ble at http://www.ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/Work_by_regions/Asia_Pacific/Cambodia.
aspx. (“The Cambodian Constitution provides for the separation of powers, including an indepen-
dent judiciary, and specifies that the legislative and executive branches shall not have judicial
power.”).
103. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
104. Eckel, supra note 92.
105. UN Staff 1, supra note 95.
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not conducted, despite the Office of the Co-Prosecutors (OCP) having de-
livered extensive files to the OCIJ.106 One of the interesting points to this
development, I found, was that there was a degree of acceptance that the
National Co-Investigating Judge was partial and under the Cambodian gov-
ernment’s control. It seemed that no one truly felt the National Judge would
be impartial, but had hoped the International Judge would be, and therefore,
would ensure proper investigations be conducted in Cases 003 and 004.
Additionally, there was also criticism about the President of the Trial
Chamber Judge Nil Nonn, because Judge Nonn had a reputation for ac-
cepting bribes in the past. “Allowing Judge Nil Nonn to sit on the ECCC
panel, despite his established history of accepting bribes, self-evidently con-
travenes international standards protecting the integrity and independence
of the judiciary.”107 If the President of the Trial Chamber has a past riddled
with accusations of corruption, how can the ECCC demand justice or hope
to deliver credible verdicts? If the summer of 2011 is indicative of what
appears to be an on-going issue of a lack of judicial independence in the
Court, the UN should mandate the ECCC’s completion, unless the
Cambodian government agrees to cease interference at the ECCC and work
to uphold international trial standards. If this condition is not met, the UN
risks being forever tied to supporting a judicial system that does not adhere
to international standards in judicial selection and fair and impartial trials.
B. The Cambodian Government Interferes with the ECCC
The Cambodian government is uncooperative and interferes with the
ECCC, making the Court unable to effectively and efficiently carry out its
mandate of bringing senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and those most
responsible for atrocity crimes to justice. “Hun Sen is a shrewder politician
than most people realize, and he’s gotten better at the game as he has gotten
older and as Cambodia has gotten wealthier. I think he’s played the game to
manipulate the court since before its creation and throughout its exis-
tence.”108 Because of the Cambodian government’s both overt and covert
interference, the UN should end its assistance to the ECCC, thus terminat-
ing the functioning of the ECCC. “For years, the Cambodian government
has bluntly shown that it wants the judicial system to operate under its tight
control. The regime has protected at least two suspects who were ranked
higher than Duch in the Khmer Rouge hierarchy.”109
106. Id.
107. Ellis, supra note 102 (“These standards are set out in the 2002 Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct (BPJC),” and “[t]he Cambodian Constitution provides for the separation of pow-
ers, including an independent judiciary, and specifies that the legislative and executive branches
shall not have judicial power.”).
108. Court Reporter, supra note 88.
109. Cruvellier, supra note 82.
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Prime Minister Hun Sen, himself a former low-level cadre of the
Khmer Rouge with ties in the court to National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang,
niece of Deputy Prime Minister Sok An,110 has openly called for the termi-
nation of the ECCC after Case 002—meaning no investigations of Cases
003 and 004.111 Even though the government should not be involved in the
cases at the ECCC, there is no doubt that its will has tremendous impact on
the Court.
Beginning with the formation of the ECCC, there were signs of gov-
ernment interference with the Court. Although the government agreed to a
tribunal, it wanted to maintain a significant presence and ownership of the
Court, hence the later agreed-upon “hybrid” nature of the court that oper-
ated in Cambodia as a uniquely Cambodian court, as its name—Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia—suggests. Because certain
members of the government were also former members of the Khmer
Rouge, the government and the UN had lengthy negotiations about the level
of prosecution the ECCC would have. These former Khmer Rouge-turned
government officials did not want to relinquish Cambodian control and
ownership and face potential prosecution down the line for their involve-
ment in the Khmer Rouge.
While these concerns by the Cambodian government do not appear to
be explicitly expressed, there are signs of this viewpoint in the words of
Hun Sen. The Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that Cambodia is better
off only trying a few people for the deaths of 1.7 million because to prose-
cute others would disrupt society.112 Even the ECCC itself, through its web-
site managed by its Public Affairs Office, explains that it limits prosecution
to senior leaders and those most responsible because:
Over the years, tens of thousands of ordinary Khmer Rouge
soldiers have defected to the government. They have nothing to
fear from this court. The policy of national reconciliation is still
in place. . . . [O]nly the most culpable people will be tried under
the law governing the Extraordinary Chambers.113
By not prosecuting people who had worked as low- and mid-level
leaders of the Khmer Rouge, the ECCC, in accordance with Cambodia’s
political will, emphasizes to civil society that peace and reconciliation are
110. Peter Maguire, Brother Duch in the Dock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.ny-
times.com/2009/02/12/news/12iht-edmcguire.2.20142831.html?_r=0.
111. Deirdre Montgomery, Cambodian PM Says Case 002 Will Be Final Case at ECCC, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW BUREAU, (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.internationallaw-bureau.com/
index.php/eccc-update-cambodian-pm-says-case-002-will-be-final-case-otp-files-appeal-in-duch-
vss-prepares-for-case-002-and-more/.
112. Peter Maguire, Opinion, Cambodia’s Troubled Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/opinion/29iht-edmaguire.html?_r=0.
113. ECCC, Who Will Be Put on Trial?, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/faq/who-will-be-put-trial
(last accessed Apr. 28, 2012).
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important priorities. The language of The Agreement114 has come under
recent scrutiny because of the disagreement within the ECCC, specifically
the OCIJ, about whether or not to investigate additional Khmer Rouge
members in Cases 003 and 004. In an email to the Phnom Penh Post, Rupert
Abbott of Amnesty International stated that the tribunal’s reputation was
being shattered by the government’s obstruction of Cases 003 and 004.115
The Cambodian government’s continuing obstruction of Cases
003 and 004 amounts to impunity for serious crimes committed
during the period of Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia. . . . Further,
this obstruction is undermining the reputation of the Tribunal and
therefore risks tainting—in the eyes of the victims and the
Cambodian public—judgments issued in Cases 001 and 002.116
Unfortunately, government interference in Cambodia should come as
no surprise. The real issue for the ECCC, then, is whether to push forward
in the investigations or acknowledge that a hybrid tribunal cannot effec-
tively function in a country with a corrupt and uncooperative government.
As Dame Silvia Cartright, a Trial Chamber judge, stated in 2009:
Countries where the rule of law is respected and where their citi-
zens can be sure of a fair trial are those in which the indepen-
dence of the courts and judges is guaranteed. . . . Comments,
politically motivated or otherwise, which appear to be an attempt
to interfere with that independence are therefore to be
deplored.117
The ECCC cannot, and should not, continue in the same path it is
headed because of the government’s interference in the Court. Rather, the
UN should adjust its course in Cambodia without accepting defeat for the
victims of the Khmer Rouge. Now is not the time to maintain the status quo
when thousands of survivors and their families are relying on a method of
justice that upholds international human rights standards. The Senior Legal
Advisor of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Joh Ciorciari, empha-
sized that:
[C]orruption is one issue that simply cannot be ignored. The
ECCC, for example, cannot make survivors of Democratic
Kampuchea whole for the abuses they suffered. What the [tribu-
nal] can do is deliver a set of credible verdicts and the promise of
114. The Agreement, supra note 43.
115. Di Certo, supra note 81.
116. Id.
117. Maggie Tait, Interference Deplored by Judge, STUFF N.Z., (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.
stuff.co.nz/worldiasiaI2315921/Interference-deplored-by-judge; see also Application for Sum-
mary Action Against Hun Sen Pursuant to Rule 35 at p. 7, Trial of Nuon Chea, No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC-TC, (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court/appli
cation-summary-action-against-hun-sen-pursuant-rule-35.
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a judicial system that will better protect and uphold [a nation’s]
rights in the future.118
C. The ECCC is Not Operating in Accordance with International
Standards
“We all have to accept that with regards to Cases 003 and 004,
the tribunal has not met international standards of justice.”119
The ECCC is not operating in accordance with international standards,
specifically Articles 9, 14, and 15 of the ICCPR and the 2002 Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC). As mentioned, Article 9 calls for
credit to be given to Duch for his time in illegal detention by stating,
“[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”120 Article 14 discusses fair trial
rights, and Article 15(2) states: “[n]othing in this article shall prejudice the
trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general princi-
ples of law recognized by the community of nations.”121 The Preamble of
the BPJC declares, in part:
THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish stan-
dards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide
guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for
regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist mem-
bers of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the pub-
lic in general, to better understand and support the judiciary.
These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their
conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial
standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and
are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing
rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.122
Because there is reason to believe that the ECCC has not followed
these international standards, the UN should mandate that the Court be ter-
minated unless the government is willing to abolish, in good faith, its cur-
118. Mark Ellis, Safeguarding Judicial Independence in Mixed Tribunals: Lessons from the
ECCC and Best Practices for the Future, 2011 INT’L BAR ASS’N REP. 43, available at http://www.
ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/Work_by_regions/Asia_Pacific/Cambodia.aspx.
119. For victims to have closure and feel that justice is being delivered, the proceedings
need to be recognized internationally as having met a certain standard, and it needs to be
felt that all sides have had a chance to tell their stories and that the truth has come out.
And if there’s interference, if certain people are not being investigated and others are for
political reasons . . . that taints the justice that is being delivered by the tribunal, and
that’s concerning for reconciliation, in terms of how the victims perceive the tribunal’s
rulings.
Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
120. ICCPR, supra note 80, at pt. III, art. 9, subpt. 5.
121. Id. at pt. III, art. 15, subpt. 2.
122. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/2003/65 (Jan. 10, 2003)
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf.
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rent interference. Although “everyone wants there to be accountability . . .
[t]he feeling is that with the political control, international standards of jus-
tice are not being met.”123
The unfortunate truth is that the Cambodian government selected the
national judges who are likely under the auspices of the Cambodian govern-
ment. This is a reality that the UN was aware of when it responded to Cam-
bodia’s request for assistance in bringing justice to those responsible for the
crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. As discussed earlier,
however, the UN conceded to certain issues involving Cambodian “owner-
ship” of the Court in an effort to end impunity. However, for the UN to take
any action to address government interference, it needs the support of inter-
national donors.
As time continues, it becomes more evident that without fair, impar-
tial, and independent judges—national or international—the Court cannot
uphold fair trial rights and therefore function in accordance with interna-
tional human rights standards. Hans Correll, the chief U.N. Negotiator dur-
ing the creation of the tribunal, echoed such concerns:
I did not want . . . the U.N. emblem to be given to an entity that
did not . . . represent the highest international standards. But of
course what we predicted seems to have developed into the prob-
lem that we were concerned would occur.124
As a result, the UN should mandate that the ECCC discontinue before
human rights, its reputation, and the Court’s credibility are further eroded.
D. Dysfunction at the ECCC Decreases its Credibility
Although the ECCC is touted as a one-of-a-kind hybrid tribunal, some
critics call the ECCC nothing more than a “kangaroo court.”125 As men-
tioned, the Cambodian government’s position is that the ECCC’s investiga-
tions into Cases 003 and 004 should cease and desist. Because of its
position, the government has been able to effectively undermine the
ECCC’s functioning and therefore reduce its credibility in the eyes of
many. As the dysfunction in the Court has continued for the past six months
or more, so too will the erosion of the Court’s credibility. Therefore, the
UN should end the ECCC sooner rather than later.
123. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
124. Eckel, supra note 92.
125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 409 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Kangaroo Court as “1. A self-
appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, per-
verted, or parodied; 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized procedures, esp. as to
render a fair trial impossible; or 3. A sham legal proceeding.”).
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In October 2011, German Judge Siegfried Blunk resigned as the Inter-
national Co-Investigating Judge in the OCIJ.126 Judge Blunk cited govern-
ment interference as his reason for leaving the Court.127 Interestingly, Judge
Blunk had been the subject of much discussion because he, along with the
national co-investigating judge, had closed the investigations into Cases
003 and 004.128 Blunk’s motives and rationale were questioned because it
was widely believed that the prosecution had delivered a plethora of evi-
dence to his office so that investigations could continue.129 There was spec-
ulation that Judge Blunk may have been bribed by the Cambodian
government or succumbed to pressure from his national counterpart and the
government. If Blunk’s resignation was not enough to hurt the ECCC’s
functioning, then his replacement’s lack of an appointment by the
Cambodian government and almost-forced resignation was.
During Judge Blunk’s appointment, Swiss Judge Laurent Kasper-An-
sermet was the reserve co-investigating judge for the OCIJ, and should have
been appointed to replace Judge Blunk as the International Co-Investigating
Judge.130 The government and Judge Bunleng clashed with Kasper-An-
sermet immediately, as Judge Kasper-Ansermet said he would resume in-
vestigations into Cases 003 and 004.131 Court observers called for Kasper-
Ansermet’s official appointment by the Cambodian government in accor-
dance with the ECCC’s legally binding agreement between the government
and the UN. According to Article 5, paragraph 6 of The Agreement, Judge
Kasper-Ansermet must be appointed to fill Blunk’s former position as the
co-investigating judge.132 The local and international communities waited
for the Cambodian government to go through the motions in appointing the
Judge, but suspected the government would be uncooperative.
Despite The Agreement, however, Kasper-Ansermet was rejected by
Cambodia’s Supreme Council of the Magistracy on Friday, January 13,
2012.133 The government’s unwillingness to cooperate and adhere to The
126. UN Calls on Cambodia to Appoint International Judge to Genocide Court, UN NEWS
CENTRE, (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40992&Cr=cambo-
dia&Cr1= (emphasis added).
127. Seth Mydans, Judge Quits Tribunal in Khmer Rouge Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/world/asia/judge-quits-cambodia-tribunal.html?_r=0.
128. UN Staff 2, supra note 96.
129. Id.
130. Judge Resigns Citing Interference, RADIO FREE ASIA, Mar. 19, 2012, http://www.rfa.org/
english/news/cambodia/resignation-03192012165430.html.
131. Bridget Di Certo, Judge Wants to Restart Case 003, THE PHNOM PENH POST, Feb. 10,
2012, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/judge-wants-restart-case-003.
132. The Agreement, supra note 43, at art. 5.
133. Statement by UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General Says Decision by Cambodia not
to Appoint Current Reserve Judge to Position on Extraordinary Chambers ‘Matter of Serious
Concern’, (SG/SM/14072) Jan. 20, 2012, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm
34072.doc.htm.
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Agreement created additional dysfunction and decreased credibility of the
ECCC.
Shortly after being officially notified by the Cambodian government
that it had not selected Judge Kasper-Ansermet as the international co-in-
vestigating judge, the UN’s Secretary-General’s spokesperson said:
‘[t]his is a matter of serious concern,’ . . . stating that the decision
is a breach of the 2003 agreement between the UN and the Gov-
ernment that set up the court, which states that the person ap-
pointed to fill this particular vacancy must be the reserve
international co-investigating judge.134
As an indication that the ECCC needed dire attention, on January 18,
2012, David Scheffer, former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, was
selected by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as the Special Expert to
advise the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials
(UNAKRT) on the ECCC. I had the opportunity to briefly meet David
Scheffer about a month later, and after he thanked me for my contribution
to the ECCC, he said that he did not know what the future held for the
Court.135
However, after becoming increasingly frustrated with the recalcitrance
of his Cambodian colleague and the resulting “dysfunctional situation
within the ECCC,” Judge Kasper-Ansermet resigned on March 19, 2012.136
In the accompanying press release, Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet said
that the “present circumstances no longer allow him to properly and freely
perform his duties.”137 A day after, Abbott called the Judge’s resignation
“really disastrous,” and said that the “interference [by the government] con-
tinues.”138 No replacement judge had been appointed as of April 29, 2012,
when this article was initially drafted, thus affirming the Court’s dysfunc-
tion and causing its credibility to suffer.
134. UN Calls on Cambodia to Appoint International Judge to Genocide Court, UN NEWS
CENTRE, (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40992&Cr=cambo-
dia&Cr1= (emphasis added).
135. In person discussion between Author and David Scheffer, Special Expert to UNAKRT
(Feb. 8, 2012).
136. Jennifer Prestholdt & Amy Bergquist, Justice Delayed May Be Justice Denied for Minne-
sotan Cambodians, MINNPOST, (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/
2012/03/justice-delayed-may-be-justice-denied-minnesota-cambodians.
137. Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, Press Release from the International Reserve Co-Inves-
tigating Judge, (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/press-release-international-re-
serve-co-investigating-judge.
138. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
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E. The ECCC’s Resources are Very Constrained and do not Meet the
Needs of the Victims in Delivering an International Standard of
Justice
It is often said that hybrid tribunals, by virtue of being located in-
country, have a greater chance of making effective contributions
to reconciliation, stability, development of the rule of law, and
capacity-building. It remains at present an open question if any
courts can successfully promote reconciliation and stability. It is
clear, however, that they cannot if they are not given the human
and financial resources, and the long-term commitment to de-
velop programs that might have such a positive effect.139
The ECCC has now operated in Cambodia for more than its originally
mandated three years, and it has had significant problems securing and allo-
cating resources throughout this time. Essentially, the ECCC seems to have
the weight of Cambodia on its shoulders. The Court is supposed to deliver
justice, prosecute and hold certain Khmer Rouge members accountable
(many years later) for atrocity crimes, provide relief/closure/compensation/
truth to victims, preserve history, and serve as a model for the Cambodian
domestic judiciary, all while operating in a country with a knowingly cor-
rupt government and adhering to international justice standards. These ex-
pectations of the Court are realistically insurmountable challenges. It would
be difficult enough for a robustly funded court to achieve any of these
goals, but it is even more challenging for the ECCC, given the political
factors and lack of resources.
As a result, the Court’s constrained resources do not meet the needs of
the victims in delivering an international standard of justice. As discussed
prior to the Court’s commencement, “[i]t will be a major challenge for the
Court to develop effective and comprehensive programs in these and other
areas within the budgetary strictures it faces.”140 Five years later, this is still
the case, and the UN should mandate the completion of the Court if it—
more accurately, donor countries and Cambodia—cannot contribute more
funds and provide better oversight for legacy initiatives.
1. Budget Structure
When the UN first contemplated forming the tribunal, it wanted to
ensure the Court was cheap and quick. Initially, the Court was only sup-
posed to last three years,141 never to be a permanent fixture in Cambodia’s
court system. Its “total three year budget of $56.3 million,”142 paled in com-
parison to heftier-funded international tribunals like the International Crimi-
139. Cohen, supra note 27, at 36.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 30.
142. Id. at 31.
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nal Tribunal for [the former] Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which “each operate with an annual
budget of over $200 million.”143 The ECCC’s budget “divid[ed] the finan-
cial obligations between a national government and an international organi-
zation like the United Nations,” and “rel[ied] on the fundraising of two
fundamentally different institutions, each of which has its own priorities
and concerns.”144 Early on, Cambodia could not fund its obligations as
agreed to under Article 44 of the ECCC Law,145 and other countries stepped
in. Japan, in fact, is the ECCC’s largest donor country.146
Before the 2012–2013 budget was passed in March 2012, it was
widely known at the ECCC that the Cambodian staff at the Court was not
being paid due to budget constraints and the budget approval process.147
The Cambodian staff already receives substantially less pay than their inter-
national counterparts, and the lack of resources at the Court certainly must
have had an impact on the Court’s overall ability to function in a time when
half of its employees were experiencing financial hardship. Additionally, if
the lack of reliable pay was not enough for Cambodian staff, it is also ru-
mored that Cambodian staff must pay part of their income back in bribes to
Cambodian officials in order to maintain their employment at the ECCC.148
2. Lessons Not Learned
The fact that the Court is relatively underfunded creates problems not
just among the staff, but arguably more importantly, among the general
Cambodian civil society. As noted, the ECCC was established, in part, to
assist in Cambodian domestic legal reform and to assist victims in the rec-
onciliation and truth-finding process. The ECCC, thus, had “legacy” initia-
tives built into its limited budget for 2012–2013, which is “encouraging,”
but so far—it seems—has not applied many of the lessons learned from the
other ad hoc tribunals about how to ensure a positive legacy.149 Former UN
143. Alison Kamhi, Private Funding for Public Justice: The Feasibility of Donations to the
Cambodian Tribunal, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 581, 584 (Summer 2007) (citing David Wippman, The
Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L J. 861, 861 (2006)).
144. Id. at 581.
145. See id. at 584–85.
146. See ECCC Financial Outlook, ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Finan-
cial%20Outlook%20-%2031%20October%202012.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (showing Japan
alone has contributed 49% of the ECCC’s budget as of Oct. 31, 2012).
147. See Ravipal Bains, ECCC Staff Protest Over Unpaid Wages, LAWYER BLOG, (Jan. 13,
2013), http://ilawyerblog.com/eccc-staff-protest-over-unpaid-wages/ (reporting that the
Cambodian staff of the ECCC “lodged a protest with the tribunal’s Office of Administration over
unpaid wages”).
148. See Virorth Doung & Sophal Ear, Transitional Justice Dilemma: The Case of Cambodia,
PEACE & CONFLICT REV. vol. 4 issue 1, n. 27 (Fall 2009), available at http://www.review.upeace.
org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=18&entrada=89#_ftn27; see also Christopher Dearing, An
Analysis of Corruption, Bias, and the High Presumption of Impartiality in the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, www.genocidewatch.org/cambodia.html.
149. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
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employee Rupert Abbott, who took the lead on the legacy in the DSS and
was the Officer-in-Charge of that section for a number of months in
2010–2011, said the Court has failed to learn three key legacy lessons: 1)
develop a comprehensive legacy strategy at the outset; 2) provide a strong
legacy oversight structure to plan and coordinate between the ECCC sec-
tions; and 3) engage Cambodian civil society organizations working to im-
prove the Cambodian justice system in the planning and implementation of
legacy initiatives.150
The Court’s failure to apply these lessons undermines Cambodian do-
mestic legal reform and civil society because it means that any legacy ini-
tiatives from the Court are “rather ad hoc in nature themselves” and “rely
solely on individuals with a passion and interest to do it.”151 Abbot
continued:
I think that there was concern that the ad hocs—the ICTY and the
ICTR, and also other hybrid tribunals like the Special Court for
Sierra Leone—did not have enough done in terms of legacy, so
there was hope that this Court could be a real driver for change in
that regard.152
But without a systematic, structured legacy strategy that includes
working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already committed
to legal reform and capacity-building, the ECCC cannot hope to leave a
positive, enduring legacy in Cambodia.
III. COUNTER ARGUMENTS TO CONTINUING THE ECCC AFTER CASE 002
There are plenty of good reasons to continue the ECCC until it has
fulfilled its legal mandate of bringing to justice senior leaders of the Khmer
Rouge and those most responsible for atrocity crimes committed from April
1975 to January 1979. However, many of these reasons rely on these two
assumptions: 1) any trial is better than no trial, and 2) there is cooperation
from the government in a hybrid tribunal. In this case, though, the
Cambodian government is knowingly interfering with the ECCC and the
ECCC is not operating under international human rights standards. Support-
ing accountability through a hybrid tribunal should be premised on the
Cambodian government’s cooperation in having a trial that meets interna-
tional standards. From a human rights perspective, “sometimes having no
trial is better than having flawed trials,”153 and this section counters some
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A. There are Alternatives to Bringing Justice to Cambodia
The primary argument for continuing the ECCC is that it should persist
in prosecuting people in order to bring justice to the victims of the Khmer
Rouge. Supporters of this argument cite The Agreement made between the
government and the UN, and point out that there was never a set number of
people who would be prosecuted based on the wording of the mandate. This
is a fair argument, but given that the government continues to interfere in
this tribunal, other alternatives of justice can and should be explored in
Cambodia. As the Court drags on, people will continue to ask:
At what point does justice delayed appear to the victims of mass
atrocities to be justice denied? It is difficult for the victims and
others who suffered in a prolonged and horrible conflict to under-
stand why justice takes so long and may not even be completed in
their lifetimes.154
Alternatives to the tribunal may be more agreeable to the Cambodian
government, which seems to be worried that its own members will face
prosecution by the ECCC. One such alternative to the ECCC is to
strengthen non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Cambodia that have
similar goals as the Court—assisting victims, educating the domestic judici-
ary, and preserving history. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-
CAM), for example, has documented thousands of pages of the Khmer
Rouge history,155 and the UN can work with DC-CAM to set the record
straight and educate Cambodian society about genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, its judicial system, and the Khmer Rouge atrocities so that this his-
tory is not repeated. This will do more good than prosecuting three to ten
people for the deaths of 1.7 million innocent people.
Although supporters of the ECCC want it to serve as a role model for
the judiciary and leave a legacy in Cambodia, the reality is that the Court is
actually setting a bad example for the Cambodian judiciary right now. Be-
cause of the lack of judicial independence and the political will of the gov-
ernment, the ECCC is being interfered with and showing the domestic
judiciary that the government can get what it wants through control and
interference. “The biggest hurdle in the way of the Court leaving a positive
legacy is really, really negative demonstration effects of ongoing political
interference.”156 As a result, the UN should focus on supporting survivors
of the Khmer Rouge through outreach and legacy projects, but with a strict
stance against government interference.
154. Cohen, supra note 27, at 5.
155. See Documentation Center of Cambodia, http://www.dccam.org/ (last visited May 7,
2012) [hereinafter DC-CAM].
156. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
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B. The Cambodian Government Should be Stopped from Continuing to
Get what it Wants
The UN’s strict stance against government interference should not be
words alone; the UN “ha[s] to follow up their words with action.”157 While
the UN possibly should be more concerned about attaching its name, repu-
tation, and resources to a Court that has ongoing, destructive corruption, the
worry is understandable that ending the Court now would send a dangerous
message to the Courts that the government can get what it wants.158 An-
other way to put it, however, is that the UN is already showing the
Cambodian government that it (the government) can continue to get what it
wants in a hybrid, international tribunal like it does in its domestic courts.
Without action, the UN risks its reputation and the real ability to assist
survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime in alternative methods that still pro-
mote truth-finding and healing for victims.
Because the Cambodian government is arguably already getting what
it wants, the UN should terminate the operation of the ECCC loudly, not
quietly, unless the government immediately cooperates and upholds human
rights in Case 002 before the Court. Currently, the UN is dealing with feuds
at the Court with “strong words,” but those words are allowing the govern-
ment to continue quietly undermining the Court.159 The UN should loudly
send the message to the government that there are repercussions at the UN
and in the international community for corruption and interference at the
Court. Namely, donor countries of the UN should advocate against Cambo-
dia obtaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2013
and 2014, something Cambodia badly wants this year.160 Furthermore, do-
nor countries can cut funding to certain “economic development” programs
in Cambodia until the government can be persuaded to uphold human rights
and fair trial practices. “It’s not as if the Cambodian government holds all
the cards. They’re aware that if this tribunal fails, and it collapses, it’s not
going to be perceived very well by the Cambodian people, certainly not
perceived well by other countries in the international community.”161
157. Id.
158. “Observers say the damage the court has suffered as a result of the feud, the lack of
transparency, and the confusing legal orders could be mitigated by how the Case 002 trial plays
out—and whether Cambodian society embraces the court’s decisions in the end.” Eckel, supra
note 92.
159. “The diplomat was blunter about the United Nations. ‘The U.N. has to make things work;
it has to get its house in order,’ said the diplomat, who was not authorized to speak to the media.
‘Where is the institution of the court’ in this feud?” Id.
160. Chun Sakada, Foreign Minister Gathers Diplomats for Security Council Bid, VOICE OF
AMERICA KHMER NEWS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/Foreign-
Minister-Gathers-Diplomats-for-Security-Council-Bid-137912233.html (noting that the country’s
“poor human rights records, its failure to approve a UN appointed judge at the Khmer Rouge
tribunal and past threats to shut down the UN’s human rights office all stand as black marks
against it.”).
161. Interview with Rupert Abbott, supra note 98.
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C. No Trial is Better than a Flawed Trial
The “view of some,” is:
Even if the trial is not perfect, even if the human rights of the
accused and the interest of the victims in terms of having a fair
trial and ensuring that the truth comes out . . . even if not ideal, at
least a trial is better than nothing at all because it will help with
the healing; it will help draw the line.162
If the ECCC perpetuates the corruption and Executive Branch interfer-
ence at the Court, it is not better than doing nothing. Something different
can and should be done that does not include eroding human rights. Articles
9, 14, and 15 of the ICCPR should be upheld and the rights of the accused
should be respected because their rights represent all others’ rights in Cam-
bodia. If the Cambodian government cannot respect the rights of those who
are being tried at a UN-backed, hybrid tribunal, how can the rights of others
be ensured, especially the rights of the innocent who may be prosecuted for
not supporting the political will at the time? The UN should end the tribunal
and come up with a new course of action to ensure that the Court can de-
liver an international standard of justice commensurate with the expecta-
tions and hopes of Cambodians.
IV. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The ECCC should be ended and donor countries encouraged by the
UN to support a permanent documentation and atrocity crimes center in
Cambodia. Without understanding or being aware of every possible factor
and consideration that exists for ending the ECCC, or not choosing this
proposed solution, I humbly offer a suggested course of action that could be
a way to combat the government’s interference and the ECCC’s inability to
uphold international human rights and promote the intentions and goals of
many, which are the following: to assist victims of the Khmer Rouge by
providing opportunities for truth-finding, healing, and education; to pro-
mote legacy through outreach projects; to strengthen the Cambodian judici-
ary; and to preserve the violent history of atrocity crimes in Cambodia so
that they never happen again. Establishing a documentation and atrocity
crimes center would assist in achieving the legacy of “lessons not learned”
mentioned in Section II.
When I began to think of a civil society organization that might be able
to perform these goals, DC-CAM immediately came to mind. DC-CAM is a
well-known, highly respected, and impressive NGO that “seek[s] to shed
light on the Khmer Rouge era,”163 and “aim[s] to help Cambodians heal the
wounds of the past by documenting, researching, and sharing the history of
162. Id.
163. DC-CAM, Focus, http://www.dccam.org/#/our_mission/focus (last visited May 7, 2012).
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the Khmer Rouge period.”164 DC-CAM was originally a field office of Yale
University’s Cambodian Genocide Program, funded by the US State De-
partment, but since 1997, has operated as an independent NGO in Cambo-
dia with assistance from “government sources in the United States, Canada,
Europe, Australia, and Japan.”165
I first learned of DC-CAM while I conducted a brief humanitarian mis-
sion for the US Embassy in 2008. Then, in 2011, my friend had the oppor-
tunity to intern for DC-CAM as a law student, and she spoke very highly of
the organization and the director and founder, Youk Chang, himself a survi-
vor of the Khmer Rouge. DC-CAM documented the atrocity crimes of the
Khmer Rouge and educated rural Cambodians about the history of the
Khmer Rouge and genocide.166 DC-CAM also conducted interviews with
survivors, witnesses, and other relevant people from the Khmer Rouge era,
and the Court used these documents for investigation purposes and as evi-
dence.167 DC-CAM “‘maintain[s] 600,000 documents[ ] related to 19,521
mass graves, 194 prisons, and 80 memorial sites. Additionally, [DC-CAM
has] interviewed 30,000 people . . . focus[ing] on oral history of the KR,
and allow[ing] this to stand-alone [without interpretation].’”168 Currently,
DC-CAM has “nearly one million pages of documents [and has] built a
reputation as an international leader in the quest for memory and justice.”169
While DC-CAM is well-equipped and knowledgeable about docu-
menting the Khmer Rouge era, it has also been working hard to create other
avenues of support for survivors and future generations. According to DC-
CAM’s website, its vision is to create a permanent institution, The Sleuk
Rith Institute (SRI), which will encompass a museum, a research center,
and a school on a section of land donated by the Cambodian government in
2008:
The Sleuk Rith Institute aims to be the leading center for geno-
cide studies in Asia. It will consist of three major pillars: a mu-
seum, a research center and a school. The museum will serve as a
public archive of the history of Cambodia where locals and visi-
tors can come not only to learn about the history of the Khmer
Rouge, but also to enjoy a quiet place for reflection and healing.
The research center will allow DC-CAM to continue its work
164. DC-CAM, Purpose, http://www.dccam.org/#/our_mission/purpose (last visited May 7,
2012).
165. DC-CAM, History, http://www.dccam.org/#/theorganization/history (last visited May 7,
2012).
166. DC-CAM, Work to Date, http://www.dccam.org/#/theorganization/worktodate (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2013).
167. Author’s personal knowledge based on work experience at the ECCC.
168. Antonio Graceffo, The Documentation Center of Cambodia, FOREIGN POL. J. (Mar. 1,
2009), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/03/01/the-documentation-center-of-cambodia/
(quoting Youk Chang).
169. The Sleuk Rith Institute, Memory of a Nation, Justice for All, http://
www.cambodiasri.org/ (last accessed May 7, 2012).
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compiling, analyzing and preserving information about the Pol
Pot era. It will also welcome scholars from around the world that
are interested in studying human rights atrocities in Cambodia
and beyond. The school will educate leading Cambodian students
about Cambodia’s history as well as certain principles of law and
human rights in an effort to build a more promising future.170
During the Initial Hearing in Case 002, a museum for civil parties was
discussed briefly since convicted persons should bear the costs of collective
and moral reparations.171 Therefore, DC-CAM’s strategic plan hopefully
serves as good news for civil parties.
Based on this finding, DC-CAM, through the SRI, is an intelligent
choice for donor countries that want accountability and justice in Cambodia
because the SRI would promote healing, documentation and memory, and
education. This Institute would reach many more people than the ECCC can
hope to, and it can educate future generations about the past, human rights,
and atrocity crimes. The SRI would even be able to create a display and
educational material about the ECCC, thereby helping to leave a legacy
regarding the challenges of an international hybrid tribunal. Furthermore,
the SRI would serve as a visual and audible reminder—through photos,
displays, paper documents, oral history, and videos—of a time when so
many Cambodians died, were injured, barely survived, and now have last-
ing scars of the Khmer Rouge era. After all, these types of mediums create
enduring impressions on people, something that court verdicts may not be
able to do.
The SRI is already being planned and shares similar objectives with
the ECCC and the Cambodian and international communities, but this insti-
tution could use more funding as it continues to develop its current vision
and build the SRI. Because of this, the UN should encourage donor coun-
tries to support the SRI and end the ECCC’s operation, unless, of course,
the Cambodian government meets the condition of full cooperation with the
Court. The SRI could continue to engage civil society in a way that is dis-
tinctly Cambodian and would leave the most impact on the people through
a museum, research center, and a school. The Cambodian government does
not appear to pose a threat to the SRI, as it has donated land to it in the past.
This most likely alleviates any concerns that it (the Cambodian govern-
ment) might shut down the NGO, as it did with certain NGOs it opposed in
2009. While the SRI will never be able to bring back the 1.7 million victims
of the Khmer Rouge or make their families whole, it can provide a lasting
impact by preserving the past with documentation and a museum, improv-
ing the present with a school, and promoting the future by conducting re-
170. Id.
171. Petit & Ahmed, supra note 61, at ¶17.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 31  3-JAN-14 13:55
532 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2
search and educating future leaders about atrocity crimes and the Khmer
Rouge.
CONCLUSION
All of that leads one to conclude this: while many people want ac-
countability, not impunity, for the atrocity crimes during the Khmer Rouge
regime in Cambodia, the Cambodian government does not, and is seriously
undermining the ECCC’s credibility, reputation, function, and ability to de-
liver an international standard of justice. There are good reasons to keep the
Court operating in Cambodia, but there are better reasons to end the Court
due to the political interference and lack of judicial independence at the
ECCC. “No one wants to admit that this is a mistake. It’s so sad. It’s a
wasted opportunity because it’s one of the worst atrocities of the
century.”172
The UN needs to mandate the termination of the ECCC, conditioned
upon the Cambodian government’s cooperation and absolute pristine deliv-
erance of international human rights in Case 002, and take further action to
ensure that the current civil society and future generations in Cambodia are
educated about the Khmer Rouge’s violent history and the issues surround-
ing delivering justice through a hybrid tribunal. Donor countries—and even
the Cambodian government—can engage civil society organizations, spe-
cifically DC-CAM through the SRI, that are already committed to re-
forming the Cambodian judiciary, to documenting the Khmer Rouge
crimes, and to educating youth about crimes against humanity, genocide,
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. This will be a step toward
ensuring that this level of human violence does not repeat itself and that
survivors understand the international community wants an international
standard of justice delivered in Cambodia as well.
172. UN Staff 1, supra note 95.
